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Micro Economics for DSM
Abstract
This paper aims to interpret Demand-Side Management (DSM) activity and to point
out its problems, adopting micro economics as an analytical tool. Two major findings
follow. First, the cost-benefit analysis currently in use has the following problems: (i)
inconsistency in cost comparison between utility costs on the supply-side and utility costs
plus customer costs on the demand-side, (ii) inconsistency in price comparisons among
different consumption levels, and (iii) arbitrary pricing after DSM implementation.
Second, DSM programs can be recognized as a conventional economic activity, if
we assume "energy service concept" as a definition for demand and also recognize the
DSM program as a supply-side option. Concurrently, (i) DSM is justified, since it
increases social welfare, and (ii) we are in a position to determine the amount of rebate to
be paid. However, (iii) the utility bill of a DSM participant should not be reduced in the
name of demand reduction, since the utility continues to provide energy service at the same
volume, and must recover the DSM costs in order to avoid double payment to the
participant. (iv) We note that the compensation method of DSM cost recovery, which is
applied in several states, has a limitation. (v) The interpretation of DSM activity proposed
in this paper is also useful in the case of marginal cost supply-side decrease.
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Energy conservation programs financed by the public utilities, which are termed
Demand-Side Management (DSM) programs, have been introduced and implemented
widely in the United States, although neither the justification nor the validity of their
success has been discussed sufficiently in economic or social terms. Consequently,
economists, regulators, and utilities officials have no integrated sense of these issues.
"Negawatts" and "Sell less and make more" are popular terms indicating these DSM
activities.1
Regulators are very aggressive in promoting DSM ventures, recommending that
power companies treat conservation programs as alternatives to supply-side options.2
Many power utilities are also active in this ambitious attempt to promote conservation
programs as equal to supply-side options. The major reasons for DSM support by utilities
are that (1) DSM provides lower cost measures to meet the demand than does the supply
option, (2) DSM can reduce the risk of future uncertainties, and (3) DSM can ease the
burden on the environment.3
As a matter of fact, "there are some 1,300 utility-sponsored energy-efficiency
programs operating in the United States right now covering all market sectors," and over
1 Lovins, A., (1985)
2 NARUC, (1989)
3 NEES (The New England Electric System Company), (1989) pp. 2-3. Hirst, E. classifies the
benefits of DSM as followings; (1) provide low-cost alternatives to construction of new power plants, (2)
save money for customers, (3) improve relations with customers by providing additional services, (4)
improve relations with state public utility commissions (PUCs), (5) reduce financial risks to utilities, (6)
improve environmental quality, and (7) enhance the economic competitiveness of utilities and their
customers. Hirst, E., (1990)
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$1.3 billion per year is expended on these programs by utilities. 4 More than 16 states have
already examined or introduced to utilities some incentive measure to promote DSM
programs.5 However, the regulatory intervention to enhance energy conservation by such
programs as DSM has proven very controversial, not only in terms of practical
methodologies but also in terms of theoretical value. Advocates of DSM are mainly
grounded in market imperfection 6 and externalities. 7 On the other hand, the typical
assertion that DSM is not an appropriate measure for the market argues that the program
acts as a producer intervening in consumers matters -- that DSM does not match the market
and might in fact distort the market.8
Additionally, the cost-benefit analysis is solely used for justification of DSM
programs and its methodology is widespread in several states throughout the United
States.9 The problems with such usage of cost-benefit analysis are that (1) the relation
between existing cost and incremental cost is not explicit, (2) the demand curve is not
counted, and (3) only marginal cost is taken into account, although rate making is usually
based on average cost.
This paper aims to (1) interpret DSM activities from the view point of micro
economics, (2) clarify the mechanisms and conditions of DSM program justification, and
(3) set forth enigma's extraction of the practical measures as an important object. The
methodology for the analysis undertaken here is dependent upon comparative statics.
The paper is divided into five sections including this introduction. The following
section examines the compensation issue of DSM costs which are actually taken on,
considering both marginal cost and average cost. The third section analyzes actual DSM
4 Speech by William B. Ellis, chairman of Northeast Utilities, at Edison Electric Institute-Unipede
meeting. Quoted from Electrical World, October, 1990, p.39
5 Reid, M. and Chamberin, J., (1990) p. 5
6 See for example, Fisher, A. C. and Rothkopf, (1989). And Bates, R., (1990) is well organized on
this issue.
See, for example, Haites, E. E., (1990)
8 Joskow, P.L., (1988)
9 The standard methodology of cost-benefit analysis on DSM program is California Public Utility
Commission and California Energy Commission (1987).
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activities by average prices and then abstracts the justification and conditions of DSM
programs. The fourth section examines a specific example of DSM and takes up the
restriction of DSM options. The fifth and final section is both a conclusion and a reference
to future works.
2. Marginal Cost, Average Cost, and DSM
Initially we need to comprehend the situation in which DSM is said to be
economically justified and review why and how DSM programs are implemented
practically. In order to do this, we take a simple model of the current electricity market
showing demand supply equilibrium.
Figure 1. simplifies the electricity market, illustrating its demand and supply
curves. We assume that the current equilibrium stays at the right side of point (*), which
is the intersection with long-run marginal cost (LRMC) and long-run average cost (LRAC).
And the price of electricity is determined by the average cost. Suppose the current demand
curve is D1-D1, consumption is q1, and price is p1.
When the marginal cost is larger than the average cost, it is quite obvious that
average cost pricing produces the social welfare losses. 10 This shows triangle A, C, E on
the chart. Therefore, the current equilibrium on the chart (price is p and consumption is
q1) does not reflect an optimal market situation. Based on this social welfare loss, we have
a policy recommendation that marginal cost pricing creates an efficient market. But
marginal cost pricing produces another practical problem. 1
10 See, Joskow, P.L., (1988)
11 Although marginal cost pricing on reWtail markeLt isa cylf&g lgfiientmarket, there are
several practical problems. Time and Use rate might be one of preliminary approach to the marginal cost
pricing. But actual marginal cost is changing to time by time. If we try to reflect this capricious cost on
rate, we need huge amounts of investments on the networks and meters. Each residential customers has to
equip instruments showing time by time price and metering its consumption. Of course it's not
impossible, and we might have such an era in future. AEP (American Electric Power) has experimented
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2.1 Market of DSM
We assume future demand is projected by D2-D2. The power company has to deal
with the incremental demand (q2-ql) , by increasing supply capacity or decreasing the
demand intentionally. The former is a supply-side option, the latter a demand-side option,
DSM. Here, we assume the demand volume reduced by DSM options is as mueh-es the
expected incremental demand (q2-ql). It means that demand curve D1-D1 remains at the
same position after DSM implementation. We don't pay attention here to the issue of
whether it is correct or not in an economic sense that the producer makes a demand curve
shift to the left because of his investment, despite its curious and uncommon occurrence in
the market. The above frameworks are the fundamental tools for this analysis.
Now we adapt the tests based on cost-benefit analysis, which usually examine the
economy of DSM programs, to fit the above framework. Generally, the conditions which
justify DSM programs in an economic sense are the following: (1) the total cost of the
DSM option is smaller than the avoided cost of the supply side: Total Resources Cost Test
(TRC test). (2) The impact on the power rate of adopting DSM options is smaller than that
of supply side: Rate Impact Test (RIM test or "no loser principal") means the power price
with DSM options is cheaper than that with supply-side options, and (3) the DSM program
is attractive to customers: Participant Test (P test). 12
We can show these tests on Figure 1. (1) The condition of TRC tests illustrates that
the marginal cost of DSM options should be lower than the point F. The cost is p3, which
is the intersection of LRMC and consumption volume q2. (2) In that case, if the power rate
this kind of system named AEM (Advance Energy-Management System). However, time is to early to
implement thorough marginal cost pricing currently. As for AEP's experimentation, see Electric World
April 1990, pp. 47-49
12 Usually, we have f ; reflecting each economic subject's benefit.
Beyond three tests mentioned, we have U Tests ( Utility Test). See, an example, California Public Utility
Commission and California Energy Commission (1987). U Test is involved in TRC Test, and also RIM
Test is counted in TRC Test, without consideration of issue of benefit allocation. See, Berman, J. S. and
Logan, D. L. (1990)
Micro Economics for DSM
with DSM options is determined under the price p2, which is indicated as point B
(intersection of LRAC and q2) then the DSM programs pass the RIM test and "no loser
principal." Actual consumption in this case is not q2 but q1. And the power rate is p4,
which is determined by D, the point of intersection of long-run average cost with DSM
options (LRAC+DSM) and q l. (3) P test is the comparison of the area O, q2, B, p2
minus the area O, ql, D, p4, which means reducing rate payment and incentives given by
utilities, with the cost paid by customers, (which is not illustrated in the chart.)
2.3 Problems of Cost-Benefit Analysis on DSM
We can point out several important problems that arise in the cost-benefit analysis
of DSM programs, using the above tools.
First, the TRC test compares the area ql, q2, F, C (or marginal cost q3) to the
DSM cost burdens on both utility and customers, although the LRMC is only for the
utility's cost function. If we want to make this comparison consistent, we must include
customer costs in the utility's supply-side LRMC from the initial stage. Therefore, the
comparison which is done in the name of cost-benefit analysis is not based on the same
standard.
Second, the power rate goes up to p4 from pl, caused by DSM costs, although the
supply volume is not changed after DSM programs are implemented. "No loser principle"
tells us p4 doesn't have any loser because p4 is cheaper than p2. But p4 is not determined
by the same condition as p2. Under the p2, a utility could supply volume q2. The
comparison of price levels which have different supply volumes is illogical. Additionally,
if we watch only consumers' surplus, it is presumed that consumers' satisfaction on the
demand curve D2-D2 is greater than that of D 1-D 1.
Third, we have assumed the power rate with DSM programs; p4 reflects the costs
of DSM and it is necessary to be below p2. Certainly this is correct. But there is still a
wide range for p4. That is, the revenue required in order to recover the DSM costs is only
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the area O, q , D, p4, and it is possible for the utility to increase revenue up to the
maximum level of the area p , ql, G, p2. This can allow regulators to approve the
spending of money for incentives to boost DSM to utilities, incentives such as shared
conservation bonuses and higher rates of return on DSM investments. In other words, we
have the possibility with DSM programs that regulators can have the power to set utility
rates and incentives arbitrarily, as long as they remain under the ceiling price. Such a
possibility means that the consistency of pricing might break down.
2.4 Limitation of DSM on Existing Facilities
All of the above discussion is based upon a situation in which we need additional
supply sources to meet increasing demand - in other words, based on long-term future
marginal costs. Can we adopt DSM programs when we already have enough existing
capacity to supply electricity? If so, under what conditions? This situation is similar to the
current equilibrium with a DI-DI curve. Let's consider this case from the view point of the
price comparison.
Here, we can have 3 equations explaining the relations among costs, demand, and
price at the initial stage, withot S mýtation
TC = FC + VC (1)
VC = ax + b(X-x) (2)
pO = TC / X
= EC/X + ( ax + b(X-x)}/X (3)
TC is the total costs of the utility, composed of fixed cost (FC) and variable cost
(VC), X is current demand level, and x is the volume which is expected to be reduced by
DSM programs. Variable cost per unit (cents per kwh) is "b", when the supply volume is
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less than X-x, or "a" when the supply volume is more than X-x. Here, "a" is larger than
"b." The main item of the variable costs is fuel cost, and we can expect this variable cost
per kwh is increasing in proportion to supply volume, since we must operate older and less
efficient generators to meet the demand expansion. This means the marginal cost is
increasing. The price level under the demand X is pO.
p* = ( FC+b(X-x)+FCdsm ) / (X-x) (4)
FCdsm is the cost of DSM programs, the volume of demand reduced by the
programs is expected x, and the price after DSM has been implemented is p*. The
condition in which DSM activities cause the power rate to sink lower than that without
DSM programs is written as follows.
p* < p0  (5)
FCdsm > x/X * ( (X-x) * (a-b) - FC ) (6)
Extend formula (5) and then we arrive at (6). Formula (6) explains that the validity
of DSM programs (FCdsm Ž 0) depends on the size of the fixed cost (-FC), the speed of
the marginal cost increase (a-b), and the demand level after DSM programs have been
implemented.
If the variable cost per kwh is stable (a = b), the DSM program makes power sales
decrease and the fixed cost per kwh increase. In that case, the utility must raise the price in
order to recover the cost already invested. Therefore, DSM programs in this situation
should not be considered valid.
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3. Micro Economics for DSM
As mentioned before, there are several problems in the current cost-benefit analysis
which is put into operation. We must improve these issues. And, it is difficult to adapt
DSM activities to the contexts of the conventional economic theory, since the theoretical
phenomenon under the name of DSM programs means that a demand curve for electricity is
made shifted to left side, not by demand side, but by supply side's activity and investment.
Figure 2 shows this phenomenon. The demand curve projected in the future without DSM
is h shown as D-D. And if we do take DSM projects, D-D would be changed to D'-D'.
Such theory, which justifies this DSM activity by suppliers, is not popular and is never
seen in text books.
How can we interpret DSM programs as an activity consistent with traditional
economic theory? In the next chapter, we will discuss this issue.
3.1 "Energy Service" Concept
First of all, we interpret DSM programs by applying a standard different from the
one used in the previous chapter. To do so, we need to be inventive with the two key
concepts; demand and supply. If we add a little metaphoric pepper, to spice up the
concepts of demand curve and supply curve, then DSM activities become consistent with
conventional economic theory.
As for the demand curve, the pepper we add here is the concept of "energy
service". That means we should consider "energy service" as the demand curve of
electricity, which reflects the utility function of rate payers such as satisfaction of lighting,
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power and cooling by consuming electricity, instead of physical kwh or kw. 13 Originally
and generally, a demand curve in theory depends not on a numerical term, but on the utility
gained by consuming goods or services. And the purpose of electricity use is to take the
utility of light, power and cooling associated with electric consumption by appliances.
Here, we think the position of the demand curve based on "energy service" is not
changed even after DSM is implemented, although the demand curve in physical terms is
shifted to the left side of its initial position. For example, we can regain the original
brightness after replacing an inefficient bulb in an efficient fluorescent lamp. Similarly a
bottle of beer when placed in a low energy use refrigerator, that has been substituted for an
inefficient one, becomes as cold as it was previously. We presume that the demand curve
of "energy service" stays at D-D, as shown on the Figure 2.
3.2 Supply Curve for DSM
The next problem is the choice of technology (measure) in the supply side to meet
the demand. Here, we will recognize a DSM program as one of supply-side options. This
recognition is precisely the same as a basic idea adopted in a Least Cost Planning (LCP),
which tries to compare demand-side options with supply-side ones at the same level to
achieve least cost purpose.
The curve S-S on Figure 2 indicates the short-term average cost curve for supply
side. The options include construction of new power plants and purchase of the power in
the wholesale market. Along with the short-term cost function, we can gain the long-term
average cost curve, which is shown as LRAC in the chart. 14 On the other hand, the cost
curve of DSM programs is drawn as SDSM-SDSM and its long-term average cost curve is
13 The adoption of "energy service" concept is not new. In the works by Sant(1984), Lovins(1985),
and Cicchetti and Hogan(1990) they use it.
14 In this part, we don't focus on the pricing issue. It is very obvious that social welfare is lost when
marginal cost is higher than the average cost under the average cost pricing. In that case, marginal pricing
is one of the policy recommendation. See Joskow P. L. (1988)
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gained as LRACDSM, indicated by the dotted line.
This figure displays the supply curve with DSM programs (LRACDSM) bent at ql
and with its position below the other one (LRAC). Thus, if a DSM program is more costly
than an option of supply side, that program is not chosen as a means to meet demand. As
for the equilibrium prices on the chart, if we adopt the DSM option to meet the demand the
price is set at p1, although in the case of supply-side adjustment p2 is the choice.
The above framework is a basic and simple tool for this analysis. (1) Measuring
demand by this "energy service" concept and (2) recognizing a DSM program as one of
supply options, peppering with those two key concepts makes explanation of DSM
programs possible by conventional economic theory.
3.3 Equilibrium of DSM
The above charts, analyzing DSM programs in terms of micro economics, provide
us with useful information about DSM activities. Following are the five fine messages
gained from these charts.
First, social welfare increases through DSM programs more than otherwise would
occur.
Here, we assume the demand curve D1-D1 is the current (initial) one and D2-D2 is
the projected future one; both are in terms of physical electricity demand. And point A on
Figure 3 is the equilibrium point between future demand and supply of electricity in
physical terms. On the other hand, point C indicates the equilibrium point between demand
and supply with DSM programs in "energy service" term, and q2 shows the equilibrium
volume. In the latter case, in which the means of meeting demand is adoption of DSM
programs, the position of the demand curve in physical term is considered to be stationary
at D1-D1 as before.
If DSM programs keep the service level at the same point as the supply option
would provide, DSM options make social welfare (consumers' surplus plus producers'
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surplus) increase as much as the area of the triangle A,C,D on the Chart, compared to the
supply options. The length ql-q2 indicates the volume of conservation of electric demand
projected.
Second, this model solves the problem of how much power utilities should pay to
DSM programs as rebates or investment. The area of the square q1,q2, C,A indicates that
amount. This area is recognized as the cost for de-coupling the level of "energy service"
demand with the level of electric demand in physical term. In other words, this amount is
the cost of increased efficiency. Therefore, the cost of DSM programs in term of rebates or
investments should be equal to the cost of "pure" efficiency increases.
Third, the chart presents the answer to the question of how much the rate payer
should pay after DSM programs have been implemented. It is not necessary to say that the
revenue required is equal to the total customers' bill, and the amount is gained by
multiplying price per kwh by volume of consumption. Here, we have determined that the
demand curve is based on the "energy service" concept and is maintained at the same level
of D2-D2, meaning the level of energy service doesn't decrease after DSM implementation.
That is , we should not reduce the customers' bills in association with the level of the
electric demand in physical term. 15
If we misunderstand that the demand level is still q , price is p1 and the revenue
required is the area of the square O, ql, A, pl, after DSM programs implementation, then
the cost of DSM programs (the square q , q2, C, A) would not be recovered. Of course,
the total bill in the case of a DSM option is smaller than that in a supply option, but we have
to keep in mind that satisfaction or utility by consuming electricity is the same level in both
options, therefore demand levels are not different. In the case of a decreased total bill, that
decrease should be caused not by demand level change, but by price reduction (p2 -p1).
Fourth, we notice the critical difference between a theoretical method and a practical
one in figuring how to compensate the cost of DSM programs. The biggest problem on
15 This conclusion is same as Ciccetti and Hogan(1990).
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the model is how to measure the level of "energy service," how to distinguish the actual
and physical volume of electric demand measured by meter from "efficiency increased,"
and how electric power companies send the bill, combined with physical demand and
increased efficiency, to the rate payer. We regret that we can not offer a solution to these
practical problems.
However, we can describe what power companies or regulators are doing to handle
these cost compensation issues in practice. The demand level in physical term being
maintained at ql, power utilities would let the price rise up to the point p3, which is at
random but cheaper than p2, in order to recover DSM costs. Revenue would increase
through this rising price. If this increment revenue (that is the area of square pl, A, E, p3)
is equal to or greater than the DSM (the area of square ql, q2, C, A), then electric power
companies can recover their costs on DSM. Price level such as p3 should be determined by
this view point. At the same time, the demand curve in physical term should remain not at
D1-D1, but at D3-D3.
Since p3 is lower than the supply side avoided cost (p2), power companies can
justify their DSM options. Using this compensation method, they employ consumption
volume which is actually measured by meter as billing data directly. Additionally, incentive
systems of DSM investments to share holders, which are examined and some appointed by
several PUCs -- such as ERAM, with the bonus based on shared conservation merit and so
on -- are also manipulated by the same mechanism; the costs of those incentives come from
the price increase.
Fifth, we can generalize from the above model. So far, we take up the issue under
conditions in which the marginal cost of the supply option is higher than the average cost,
meaning that both marginal cost and average cost are increasing. We can embrace the
above model's framework, except for the interpretation of a price rise to compensate DSM
cost in practice, on the condition that the marginal cost is decreasing. The important
considerations are (1) adopting the "energy service" concept as demand curve, and (2)
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recognizing a DSM option as one of the supply side options. These two key peppering
agents could be used similarly even under the condition of decreasing marginal cost and
whether an economy of scale exists or not.
4. Concrete Instance of Above Model
Here, we will consider an example in order to grasp a concrete image of the above
model.
4.1 Concrete Instance
Suppose that the current revenue required of a power company is $80, including
fixed costs and variable cost, and the total demand of electricity is 1000 kwh, then the price
is $.08 per kwh. Here we'll have a new increment demand of 100 kwh, and an
incremental cost to meet that is $10. On the other hand, the DSM optional cost is $8 to
reduce 100 kwh in physical term. The marginal costs of both options are $. 10 per kwh and
$.08 per kwh, respectively. The DSM option is clearly less costly. That is, if the cost of
DSM programs, which provide the same service level as supply-side options, is equal to or
lower than supply-side costs, then we conclude that the DSM program is cost effective.
When we take a stand of long-run average cost, we will recognize that DSM
programs demonstrate the following characteristics. The level of "energy service "
provided by DSM programs is equal to that of supply side options, although the demand of
electricity in physical term in the two cases is different. Therefore, the unit price per
"energy service" kwh in the case of the DSM option will not change, but will maintain the
initial price of $.08 per kwh. The bill is calculated based on this "energy service" kwh.
Compared to this calculation, the unit price in the case of the supply side option will change
to $.0818 per kwh. The key factor in the above calculation is that the sales volume, which
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is adopted as the denominator to gain the price, is based not on the physical electric demand
but on the "energy service" concept.
Are there any cases in which the long-run average price with the DSM option is
lower than that with the supply side option even in the calculation based on demand in
physical term? Yes, there are, and those cases might be very acceptable to rate payers, in
general. We 'll describe such an instance.
4.2 Long-Run Average Cost in Physical Term
The condition in which the long-run average cost with DSM options is lower than
that with supply side options calculated by physical demand of electricity (not using the
"energy service" concept here) is represented as follows.
(A+Cs)/(X+x) > (A+Cdsm)/X (7)
Here, A is the existing cost, Cs is the increment cost by supply side option, and
Cdsm is the increment cost by DSM option, respectively. And X is the demand level in the
initial stage and x is additional demand.
If the value of the right side is smaller than that of the left side, then the long-run
average cost with DSM option is lower than that with the supply side option, even though
we adopt physical demand level as the denominator to calculate the price. And the value of
the right side means the price level to compensate the DSM costs recovery (that level which
is price p3 on the chart shown before) is lower than the left side value (which means p2 on
the chart), so the price should be readily accepted, giving power companies and regulators
justification for DSM programs.
The above formula is expanded as follows.
x / X < (Cs - Cdsm) / (A + Cdsm) (8)
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Cdsm < (CsX-Ax)/(X+x) (9)
The formula (8) shows the DSM option has advantages when the growth rate of
demand is smaller than that of cost deferential between supply side and DSM options to
total cost with DSM option. In other words, the advantages of DSM options depend on
both the projected demand growth and the supply side cost.
The formula (9) indicates ceiling amount to DSM investment practically, compared
to supply side options. If we refer to the above example, Cdsm should be less than $1.82.
This amount is equal to the that long-run average price is $.0818 per kwh under the
calculating conditions which we adopt, and demand is determined by physical term after
implemented DSM options. If the cost of DSM options is lower than this figure, we can
afford to price hike to compensate DSM cost recover.
4.3 The condition of Cost Compensation
However, we should notice the restriction of compensation using the above
mechanism; boosting price compensation. Here the fundamental condition for DSM
program implementation is that Cdsm must be a positive number.
Cdsm > 0
1 < (Cs/A) / (x/X) (10)
The right side of the formula (10) demonstrates the slope of marginal cost of supply
side options. The value should be greater than 1.0. That means that marginal cost is
increasing. Therefore, the compensation method for recovering DSM costs -- which
measures demand in physical term and boosts the price to compensate DSM costs --, a
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method widely adopted in the states, is only valid under the increasing marginal cost of
supply side options. In other words, if the marginal cost of supply side options is
decreasing, this compensation method does not work and DSM options are not justified.
Consequently, power companies and regulators should pay attention to this important
restriction of their cost compensation method.
5. Conclusion
Using micro economics as an analytical tool, this paper surveys DSM activity and
its problems, as summarized below.
(1) The cost-benefit analysis currently in operation has the following problems; (a)
inconsistency of cost comparison between costs of utility in supply-side and costs of utility
plus customers in demand-side, (b) inconsistency of price comparison among different
consumption levels, and (c) arbitrary pricing after DSM implementation.
(2) DSM programs can be recognized as a conventional economic activity, if we
adopt "energy service concept" for demand and if we recognize a DSM program as one of
the supply-side options. Along with this recognition, (a) DSM is justified, since it
increases social welfare, and (b) we can answer the question of how much rebate should be
paid. However, (c) the bill of a DSM participant should not be reduced in the name of
demand reduction, since the utility continues to provide energy service in the same volume,
and the utility needs to recover the DSM costs and avoid double payment to the participant.
(d) We should notice that the compensation method to recover the DSM costs, which is
applied in several states, has a limitation. (e) The interpretation of DSM activity presented
by this paper is also useful even in the case of marginal cost in supply-side decrease.
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We have two important future works. One is to develop the index or unit to
measure the "energy service concept." "Energy service concept" is a useful tool to
understand the DSM activity in theory, however we have a practical difficulty in measuring
it.
The other prospective work is a precise study based on actual proof about the cost
structure of power companies. Basically, the validity of DSM programs depends on
whether a utility's cost structure is under the marginal cost increase or not. What is the
actual situation? Although many distinguished authorities have attempted to clarify this
issue, it is very difficult to draw conclusions.
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Table 1. Example of DSM Effects
Current Future Option
Status Supply DSM
Increment Cost ( $ ) 10.00 8.00
Total Cost ($) 80.00 90.00 88.00
kwh in
Energy Service Concept 1,000 1,100 1,100
E kwh in
a Physical Term 1,000 1,000
cents / kwh in
a Energy Service Concept 8.00 8.18 8.00
" ents / kwh in
Shysical Term 8.00 8.18 8.80
cents / kwh in
U Energy Service Concept - - 9.00 8.00
to cents / kwh in
2 Physical Term - - 9.00 00
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